SearchVoatBot ago

This submission was linked from this v/pizzagate comment by @shewhomustbeobeyed.

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carmencita ago

Almost all my comments got down voated. That should tell you we are hitting a nerve.

NOMOCHOMO ago

All of my posts/my threads have been downvoated to the negative -1/+1

Vindicator ago

You'll want to use a double carriage-return to get some paragraphs going here.

Dumping six posts on the board, back to back, with shitty formatting, is going to make a lot of people here dismiss this as another shill forum slide.

NOMOCHOMO ago

Thank you, attempting to reformat now

Vindicator ago

NC, another thing that may be effecting this thread is that we just had a major shill takedown. You can read about most of it in the stickied thread at the top. We have no way of knowing if the individuals involved in the astroturfing and vote brigading are creating new alts now that their main accounts have been exposed. Since you showed up just after they were busted, and began posting about some of the same topics they've pushed (vampires, Masons, etc), your threads are not getting a lot of traction. It would have been better if you built a trustworthy reputation here before dumping all your research, especially given the timing.

I am erring on the side of giving you the benefit of the doubt and explaining the situation, since you may actually be a legit user with valuable information to impart who happened to walk into a firefight.

carmencita ago

Do not be deterred. You have no idea what has happened to me here. Ride it out.

carmencita ago

Some shills are really mad. Or what else. Does someone know?

Vindicator ago

I doubt it's shills. It's probably pissed off researchers who think this is another alt of EsotericShade.

https://voat.co/v/pizzagate/2809501/14656874

carmencita ago

Thanks.

NOMOCHOMO ago

Perhaps, But the truth always comes out

carmencita ago

Eventually. But they like holding it off as long as possible. But yes, it will come out.

carmencita ago

Wow. Well, we can guess that maybe the DPA was the precursor to the Family Act under Clinton that made it legal to take Children away from their parents, when in reality they really did nothing to deserve it. Their wheels are always turning when it comes to stealing Our Children. I wonder how many of these poor little lads and lassies made it to really good and loving homes. How many went to Military families like they did in Argentina. Btw, I was an Immigrant little girl and when I came to this country with my parents, I was called a DP. They called me that because they didn't understand the meaning, just that now Immigrants were DPs. It still stings.

NOMOCHOMO ago

While I can't prove it, I suspect the majority of these orphans were military families. The majority of leaders in AHEPA were recruited by CIA and OSS (Clan of Worms pt 3)

Clan of Worms Part 5, I show how the Order of AHEPA founded their "Boystown" across the water from Westpoint NY. Despite multiple lawsuits and accusations of child trafficking, they are still operating in NY state.

carmencita ago

The pipeline never ends for these sickos. They need their fix of Victims. Those that pass and push these laws deserve a special place in He77.

NOMOCHOMO ago

...continued "Best Possible Immigrants"

Paving the Way for an International Adoption Program in Greece

When Mitler’s investigation began in the late 1950’s, Greece had been a sending nation for adoptable children for nearly a decade. Although US families also adopted internationally in the same era from Germany, Italy, and Ireland, the Greek program became the most robust more than any other European nation, Greece suffered from political and economic turmoil long after World War II, mostly rooted in the three-year civil war from 1946-1949 that devastated the country. Although tensions had been building between Greek nationalists and the Greek communist party (KKE) throughout World War II, 1945 was a watershed year. Increasing violence toward communists and the failure of elites to institute moderate centrist politics eventually led to takeover by the royalist Right in March 1946. These anticommunist forces, especially in local municipalities, imposed what one historian described as a “reign of terror,” rendering the central government ineffective at reining in the provinces….Britain, still recovering from World War II, sent resources to the National Army, but its ability to offer more significant aid was limited, leading the Greek government to request additional help from the United States. On May 22, 1947, President Truman allocated $300 million to the Greek government, “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” famously known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman also sent a delegation of the U.S. military advisors to Greece. At the end of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group expressly to assist the Greek Armed Forces in bringing national stability. These consultants worked with the Embassy, delegates from the government, and civilians to “defend their native” land w”without thte need of a single American rifleman.” As the Greek military gained U.S. resources and support, it succeeded in blockading the guerillas and turning the war into one governed by more conventional military tactics. Coupled with the loss of Tito’s crucial support in 1948 because of a split with Stalin, the KKE could not afford to keep fighting and surrendered in 1949. While Greece allegedly enjoyed peace after the war ended, as historian Mark Mazower argues, “it was a strange, strained peace, guarded by what was formally a democratic order but held in place by repression, persecution of the Left, and armed violence on the fringes of society.” Displacement, separation, and exile characterized the war years and the lives of Greek civilians. The orphan crisis was especially acute. Since 12 percent of Greek children had lost one or both parents during World War II, the nearly 340,000 children orphaned over the course of the civil war overwhelmed the already shaky social welfare system. Relatives who might have continued to care for orphan children in better times often could not afford to do so. As child welfare officers stationed in Athens observed, “the poverty in the villages is unbelievable” Since neither the nationalist government nor the communist resistance had the resources to meet all Greek Children’s needs, they developed ways to care for orphans that reinforced their respective ideologies. The Greek nationalists sent children to paidopoleis or child-towns for state education while the communists evacuated groups of children behind the Iron Curtain to Yugoslavia in what became known as paidomazoma (meaning literally, “gathering of the children”)-a term coined by Greek anticommunists. Paidomazoma was a historical reference to the forcible conversion and conscription of Greek Orthodox children under the Ottoman devshirme system and one highly sensitive in the Greek national memory. Because most families could not offer their children the same degree of protection as before, the state began to assert itself as the ultimate protector of Greece’s children. Once the nationalist side triumphed, this meant the government would use children to symbolize its commitment to anticommunism. This STATE “OWNERSHIP” of CHILDREN formed the philosophical and logistical IMPETUS for SUPPORTING an INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION program to the United States.

NOMOCHOMO ago

...continued "Best Possible Immigrants" Unlike most other European nations, which staunchly objected to foreign adoption to the United States as relief to their orphan woes, the Greek Nationalist state welcomed the relief. Officials wanting to protect Greek children from further communist influence while also offering them increased economic opportunities. Of the 120,000 orphaned children in need of state support, welfare institutions and benevolent agencies had the resources to support only 42,500, leading the Greek government to ask for the United States directly for assistance. In an informal note from the Hellenic Ministry of Social Welfare to the U.S. Embassy in Athens, the Greek foreign minister insisted, we hardly need to emphasize how deeply grateful we feel to the U.S. government and to Congress for the opportunity generously granted to some of those unfortunate children to emigrate to the United States for adoption.” The Greek government did qualify, however, that it expected the majority of these children to be placed in first and second generation Greek families that adhered to the Orthodox faith. This was probably because 95 percent of the Greek children available for adoption from 1950-1952 were older children with Greek American relatives interested in adopting them. U.S. foreign ministers emphasized this requirement and stressed that social welfare agencies needed to comply with officials’ intent. One year later, in 1951, the Displaced Persons Commission issued a report assessing the government “attitudes” toward international adoption. The report found that Greek officials “expressed considerable interest” in placing children in the United States with plans to use the entire quota. At the same time as officials pursued an international adoption program with the United States, the Greek state was demanding that Yugoslavia return the children during the paidomazoma, illustrating how keenly national. Anticommunist interests governed the migration of Greek children. The Greek state’s need for orphan relief dovetailed with U.S. economic, social, and political objectives in Europe. The Truman Doctrine’s influx of relief money tied the United States to Greece, a relationship that only became more intimate as the Cold War escalated, first with the Berlin Airlift from 1948 to 1949 and then with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. One article published in Senior Scholastic, a magazine aimed at high school students, even used the adoptive family as a metaphor for U.S. political and economic interests in Greece. Titled Orphan Greece: Shall Uncle Sam Adopt This Problem Child?,” the article portrayed Greece as the Child, the United States as the parent, and adoption as the only reasonable for long-term self-sufficiency. Stressing U.S. authority and Greek dependency, President Truman argued, “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our nation.” Yet this was a particular type of dependency meant to pull on American heartstrings and make the public emotionally invested in Greek’s future. Further driving home Greek hardship the Senior Scholastic article’s sole photo showed a small peasant boy sitting in front of the Parthenon amid piles of rubble while looking off into the distance. A decidedly mixed message , the child’s distant, stony gaze symbolized Greece’s uncertain future, but the scene of ancient ruins pointed to the nation’s strong past as a glimmer of hope. Focusing on a child also related to Senior Scholastic’s teenage readers and inspired them to adopt a more global outlook, subtly enlisting youth as junior cold warriors. Overall, text and photo both depicted Greece’s child-like dependence on U.S. intervention, a concept reinforced in refugee hearings when one witness asserted, “Greece today exists wholly and solely because of American financial assistance Without it, there would be no Greek nation. It couldn’t feed itself, it couldn’t clothe itself, it couldn’t conduct the war it is conducting without American assistance.” As this quote implied, the Cold War linked together U.S. economic prosperity with foreign policy objectives, “yoking…free choice as consumers with political freedom” in the words of Lizabeth Cohen, and helped average U.S. citizens to invest in Greece’s capitalist and democratic future by supporting foreign aid.

NOMOCHOMO ago

International adoption achieved this relationship even more effectively since it brought American families and Greek orphans together, unifying international interests under both the symbolic and the literal U.S. family. As the State Department’s General Counsel pleaded, “for those unfortunates who disappear behind the Iron Curtain there is little left except the slim hope that their children may start life anew in one of the democratic countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain. To say to them that we recognize the separation but not for the purposes of the Displaced Persons Act would be to slam the last door on their meager hopes and at the same time deny admission to an otherwise eligible orphan whose only fault is a technicality in the law. Just like Greek officials, U.S. legislators depicted the Southern and Eastern European parents of Cold War orphans as unable to escape communist oppression--”absent” parents because they were lost to communism. But as long as immigration laws remained as liberal as possible, the United States could ensure that their children would still have a bright future in the “free West.” … Americans of Greek origin knew this and lobbied hard to convince legislators of their worthiness. During the deliberations over the 1947 Displaced Persons Act, AHEPA representatives asked that legislators extend 1,000 additional quota spaces to Greek migrants, many of whom had already come to the United States illegaly. The AHEPA leaders suggested that rather than add to the total immigration numbers, these should be taken from Germany’s generous and unused allotment….In addition to advocating for refuggees, American-Greek organizations started targeting relief to help children and maintain social welfare support programs in Greece. The Greek War Relief Association, headquartered in New York City, launched its orphan support project in August 1946, with the mission of finding foster and permanent homes for orphaned children as well as rigorous social welfare training in Greece. This partnership with the Greek government and the United Nations had no foreign adoption program, instead focusing purely on domestic placements. Yet the Greek War Relief Association was soon overshadowed by the larger and more prominent Order of AHEPA. In addition to running a civic education program that prepared new immigrants for U.S. citizenship, AHEPA devoted itself to patriotic and philanthropic work, including selling war bonds , collaborating with RED CROSS relief, and raising money for hospitals and orphanages. Initially AHEPA began its outreach as a partner of the Greek War Relief Association, working together to BUILD HOSPITALS, but the fraternal order eventually gained official government status in its own right. AHEPA also embraced US Cold War policies in Greece, adding political weight to its philanthropic work. In the order’s internally commissioned history, the author highlighted AHEPA’s commitment to the Truman Doctrine, US policies in Europe, and its anticommunist allegiances, referring to the Greek communists as “terrorists’ and “guerrillas.” Presenting before the Senate Subcommittee on the Displaced Persons, AHEPA blamed the current upheaval in Greece on “the Communist-inspired civil war and the present Communist-inspired aggression and insurrection against the recognized Government of Greece,” Rather than seeing the civil war as an internal action, AHEPA officers considered it “a deliberate attempt on the part of Communist-controlled countries to the north of Greece to destroy Greece as a democracy,” an assessment with which the subcommittee agreed...Fittingly, in 1963, AHEPA erected a statue of Truman in Athens to commemorate the Truman Doctrine and his leadership in “saving” Greece from communist control. This loyalty to US and Greek nationalist interests made AHEPA a favorite of the State Department, who designated the order as “an arm of the government of the United States in administering the resettlement of 10,000 Greek refugees.” Much of AHEPA’s lobbying work embraced the anti-communist language so popular during the early Cold War. When presenting an appeal for the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, AHEPA…The administration also linked AHEPA’s work to the preservation of democracy because of American democracy’s roots in ancient Greece. This magnified AHEPA’s relief work in a war-torn country as a larger Cold War fight for the representative government and free-market capitalism. This idea—that those from the outside could be the most influential insiders in protecting the United States-appealed to State Department officials. It also marked AHEPA’s foray into international adoption as an explicitly anticommunist endeavor.

NOMOCHOMO ago

Shaping Greek Adoptions through Private Interests Its national loyalty, along with the large number of Greek children going to U.S. relatives gave AHEPA an early foothold in Greek adoptions. AHEPA officials, including a Minnesota state representative, lobbied heavily for the 1950 amendment to the DPA, arguing that the “Greek-American community of the United States would see that these displaced persons and orphans would be properly taken care of” in order “to make democracy live.’ In late 1950, AHEPA became a voluntary agency accredited by the Department of State’s Voluntary Foreign Aid Committee based on its partnership with USCOM. an umbrella agency with existing accreditation. This meant that AHEPA could officially place children for adoption in U.S. homes based on USCOM’s record. Through this arrangement, families contributed Sioo to the agencies on a voluntary basis to support administrative costs, which were fairly low because AHEPA’S staff was not paid.’ AHEPA’S role as an adoption intermediary, and the significant role of the U.S. Committee for the Care of European Children (USCOM), signaled the influence of voluntarism on the structure of international adoption. USCOM, a private association, licensed AHEPA, another private agency, to work on placing Greek orphans in U.S. homes.” AHEPA had no background in child welfare work, no trained social workers on staff, and no professional accreditations or associations with other child welfare agencies. The fraternal order’s representatives revealed this inexperience in their initial proposal to the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid. When suggesting how to process tiles for named orphans—those children intended for relatives or specific sponsors—AHEPA volunteers assumed that “in these cases there would be little or no need for screening by our organization unless your Committee or the other official bodies deem that it is necessary’” Since officials mandated the routine screening of named children to confirm their identities, verify, their social histories, and assure that their parents or guardians had properly relinquished them, comments like these highlighted AHEPA’s limited exposure to child welfare standards. This inattention to screening children suggested that AHEPA leaders were principally concerned with expedient resettlement of Greek children into Greek American families. On the surface, it seemed curious that officials knowingly approved AHEPA since the European program functioned under child welfare paradigm practices. Evelyn Rausch, director of the Displaced Persons Orphan Program, assured Elliott Shirk, the director of resettlement, that those responsible for child placement were required to make comprehensive home studies, maintain compliance with state Departments of Welfare, and conduct thorough background checks on orphans. Rausch even recruited U.S. adoption specialists to staff the commission’s European headquarters in Frankfurt to ensure that the agency handled all cases meticulously.”’ Yet, three months after Rausch’s letter, the two DPC social workers stationed in Greece, Lena Cochran and Helen McKay, informed Robert Corkery, European coordinator for the DPC. that matters looked rather different in Greece. Because of insufficient transportation, no local authority with extant records, overwhelmed staff and inexperienced volunteers. children were routinely sent to the States without completed social histories. Working in a country with deplorable conditions and few resources certainly caused sonic of the mishaps, but other difficulties came from AHEPA’S direct management of cases. While the original arrangement intended that Cochran and McKay should supervise all of the casework, there were too many children to make this feasible. This not only meant that hundreds of orphans arrived in U.S. ports without being screened, but also meant that the operations in Greece were slipshod and rudimentary. This inattention to proper casework infuriated the two professional social workers in command, Both Cochran and McKay insisted. ‘In many people’s minds we are identified more with AHEPA at this point than the DP. Commission. We question seriously whether this is a desirable position for a government agency to be placed in,” particularly since “we are...in the position of defending the AHEPA-U.S. Committee plan when in fact we disagree in many cases.”’ Cochran and McKay were not the only naysayers; the U.S. Consul in Athens and Greek travel agents responsible for arranging children’s transportation also complained about AHEPA’s inflated fees and unprofessional services. Once these concerns came to light, officials tried to remove the fraternal order Irons the program. Less than a year after accrediting AHEPA, USCOM director Ingeborg Olsen questioned her agency’s decision to approve AHEPA and took her concerns to a higher authority. In a meeting with State Department officials from the Voluntary Foreign Aid division under the Bureau of Economic Affairs, Olsen explained that while her relations with AHEPA’S leadership were cordial, she was dissatisfied with their lack of training. Her efforts, for instance. “to convince Ahepa [sic] of the fact that named children going to relatives or friends sometimes need special care when their placements were unsuccessful,” went nowhere. When Olsen suggested that AHEPA fund a USCOM child welfare worker in Greece, the organization refused, instead focusing their resources on setting up a new orphan program.”’ Three weeks later, Voluntary Foreign Aid staff reported additional AHEPA problems to the Office of Greek. Turkish, and Iranian Affair, another State Department agency. Despite officials’ attempts to have AHEPA work collaboratively with a child welfare agency knowledgeable in immigration and resettlement, the organization insisted on handling orphan services themselves. AHEPA leaders’ persistence in processing adoptions colored the organization’s actions as inherently political. Indeed, after “considerable criticism,” Chairman of the AHEPA DP Committee George Polos flew to Greece to try to improve the program himself, insinuating that AHEPA’s mismanagement compromised its national reputation as a bulwark against communism.’ Polos’s visit did little good and USCOM proceeded with the derecognition of AHEPA in early 1952. In their efforts to limit AHEPA’s influence, social welfare experts butted up against the same barriers they faced when trying to regulate domestic “gray market” adoptions. Once the Children’s Bureau heard that USCOM planned to derecognize the fraternal order, Director Mildred Arnold sent a memo to her staff, informing them that AHEPA was no longer considered a voluntary organization accredited by the Stale Department to conduct adoptions and that they should notify all state Departments of Welfare at once. This was especially urgent. in Arnold’s opinion, because it appeared that AHEPA planned to continue placing children without consulting professional child welfare agencies.’° But there was little that Arnold could do besides inform stale officials since many state laws allowed independent operations like AHEPA to place children. Although Children’s Bureau representatives labored to convince State Department officials that “state departments of public welfare feel obliged to work only with accredited agencies.” the federal government could do little. The state-based system was set up to legally permit both public and private, both accredited and unaccredited. DPC officials also considered how they might force AHEPA to become accredited separate from USCOM. The Orphan Section Supervisor explained in a letter to her superior that state laws would offer the best way to convince the order that it needed to be licensed since it violated state law to process adoptions without a proper license) This was not completely accurate, however. It was not illegal for unlicensed entities to process adoptions unless a state explicitly prohibited it. Some slates, Minnesota and New York for example, had laws prohibiting the interstate transfer of children without the approval of a licensed agency. But just as many stales didn’t, This seemed more like a case of wishful thinking on behalf of Children’s Bureau officials who immediately recognized the danger in a well-respected, and politically well-connected, organization like AHEPA being permitted to make placements without professional ties.

NOMOCHOMO ago

Just as with doctors and attorneys who placed children domestically, AHEPA’s philanthropy and community service accolades gave it an unblemished public record and credibility with legislators. When the famed juvenile delinquency hearings held one of their sessions in Pittsburgh. the subcommittee requested testimony from Louis Manesiotis, a Pennsylvania businessman who was also serving as the supreme governor of AHEPA. The order’s facilitation of numerous youth programs and coordination with other local organizations—Kiwanis, American Legion, and Knights of Columbus—to protect against juvenile delinquency brought it praise from Senator Estes Kefauvcr. Congress also recognized AHEPA as the leading Greek refugee organization with at least six invitations to appear before various committees. As Senator William [anger (R-N.D.) effused during a RRA hearing. AHEPA “has done a marvelous iob,” and is considered “one of the finest organizations in America. We have a great many members in our State. some of the finest citizens, all of whom “have a marvelous record.”’° Many prominent politicians numbered themselves among AHEPA’S ranks, including Spiro Agnew. representative William Cramer (R.FL), Senator Samuel Ervin (D.N.C.), and California governor Goodwin Knight. In fact, Langer himself was also a member. Probably because of the fraternal order’s political connections, alongside an unanticipated surge in Greek cases in late 1951, AHEPA gained new accreditation in early 1952 to operate separately from USCOM and continue placing orphans.’’ Even with this seeming affirmation of their commission, AHEPA staff continued to frustrate the DPC social workers by their administrative oversights, including failing to provide appropriate travel escorts and under-dressing orphans for their Atlantic voyage. But with a still unmanageable number of cases, DPC staff needed the extra hands. As cases continued pouring into the Greek office, social workers worried that the Displaced Persons Act’s June 30 expiration would come before most of the children could be placed.” AHEPA staff remained in the country, working alongside DPC staff. In fact, even with the program expiring, Al-IEPA received 250 new orphan cases in mid-March that would keep AHEPA in Greece well into August, weeks after the other staff. But AHEPA’s perseverance failed to redeem its relationship with USCOM. When the agency (Pages 60 to 301 are not shown in this preview.)

Nadeshda ago

Dude, more paragraphs please and break it into bite size pieces... toooo much to take in all at once, phew...

NOMOCHOMO ago

Sorry, I followed the original paragraphs in the text of the book.

I'll try to re-edit for simplicity though

Nadeshda ago

Awesome news, glad you are here :)

NOMOCHOMO ago

TLDR

AHEPA used its political capital as undercover operatives in WWII to lobby for increased immigration and international adoption.