MICE

M: Other than saying that bribes aren’t okay it doesn’t really look for vulnerabilities such as unmanageable debt, gambling problems, or other expensive hobbies. Spies for money are more about need than greed.

I: Ideological spies are never considered because any infiltrators are considered to be police or PIs. Another rival organization with different values could easily penetrate the system because ideological spies join with the intent of spying.

C: Very little is done to prevent compromise. Drug problems and criminal backgrounds have been used to flip people before, but people with drug problems and criminal backgrounds are not given additional suspicion as a rule. An honor system is proposed where a co-conspirator says if he has warrants or is an illegal alien.

E: Ego is somewhat addressed through prohibitions on gossip, bragging, and untoward curiosity. A very useful distinction is made for liars. Lying up your action is unforgivable because it will still be used as evidence against the organization, it shows that you are an unreliable person, and it doesn’t help. Lying down (i.e. denials and minimization) is encouraged as it spreads disinformation that complicates evidence and it belies a lack of ego issues. However such a premium is placed on recruiting marginal people that these steps are essentially useless given the nature of the organization.

Interrogation is not addressed in any practical sense. It lies moral invective against a psychological situation. Everyone agrees that they would never give up their friends for moral reasons. Nobody expects the interrogator to get in their heads. The IRA had effective counter-interrogation because it explained interrogation as a strategy of desperation that is only done with a lack of evidence. If they had evidence they wouldn’t need a confession. Just don’t talk is Nancy Reagan-tier advice.

Communication is extremely hampered because of the requirements of secrecy necessary for criminal behavior. Beyond flyering (which for any leftist movement is a totally null factor anyhow) it has no real outreach beyond the propaganda of the deed. Essentially it needs people to be impressed by how cool their action is and how cool they are for doing it without somehow connecting the evidentiary dots. These organizations can only function as auxiliaries to a non-criminal entity, eg Sinn Fein to the IRA. While no security culture literature goes into that any effective antifa organization is effectively the auxiliary to a public relations campaign by a more legitimate group. A significant weakness is that bogus spokesmen can easily hijack the PR outfit of a quasi-covert outfit.

It does have some strengths. Commonsense rules regarding behavior. By institutionalizing OPSEC it makes infiltrating harder. Ensuring that need to know is limited to those who are going to do it makes passive information gathering harder, wallflowers need not apply. It also presupposes bad faith on the part of the police and media which is a correct observation. The technical aspects of avoiding discussions next to future scenes of action, in homes, or in cars make sense. Not discussing this via email or phone is also a no-brainer. It also accepts that infighting is a state objective.

Overall security culture is marginally beneficial for marginally effective groups. More effective groups don’t need half the methods and do the other half much better.