P169-171
"Mr. Parmiter. All right. I'm going to show you one more document here, which we're going to mark as exhibit 8.
Mr. Rybicki. Thank you.
[Rybicki Exhibit No. 8 Was marked for identification.]
Mr. Parmiter. Do you recognize that document?
Mr. Rybicki. I don't readily recognize it, but it appears to be an email, again, with the same talking points and me forwarding it to .
Mr. Parmiter. Who is [Redacted]?
Mr. Rybicki. [Redacted] was a special government employee of the FBI, who -- he's a professor at -- the institution popped out of my head, in New York.
Mr. Parmiter. [Redacted] Law School?
Mr. Rybicki. [Redacted] Law School. A professor at [Redacted] Law School, who served as a special government employee to the FBI.
Mr. Parmiter. Okay. So what is a special government employee?
Mr. Rybicki. It is a designation, so it's an unpaid position. I don't know all of the parameters surrounding it. So he had a memorandum of understanding and was working on various projects for the FBI. He had a clearance and badge access to the building, but didn't -- you know, he didn't work full time or, you know, have an office in the building, that type of thing.
Mr. Parmiter. And what were the circumstances that led to Mr. [Redacted] being a -- being brought onboard as a special government employee?
Mr. Rybicki. Director Comey had asked to bring him on to help with some special projects.
Mr. Parmiter. Is that fairly frequent? I mean, is that a rare occurrence or is it a frequent occurrence that special government employees come on at the behest of the Director?
Mr. Rybicki. He was the only one that we brought on during the time.
Mr. Parmiter. Are you aware of any other special government employees at the FBI at any time?
Mr. Rybicki. I am not.
Mr. Parmiter. Okay. What was the nature of Director Comey's sort of relationship with Mr. [Redacted] while he was at the FBI?
Mr. Rybicki. I don't know if it would be fair for me to characterize it. I don't know the extent of their communications. Again, he was brought on to work on some special projects, mostly in an advisory capacity, but I don't know it'd be fair for me to characterize.
Mr. Parmiter. Were any of the special projects the investigation we've been talking about today?
Mr. Rybicki. No. The biggest special project was the Going Dark initiative. "
Hmmmm.
This was interesting to me because I recall something about Comey leaking a letter or something to a professor regarding the Trump investigation stuff. Could this be that guy?
And, what is this "Going Dark" initiative? I found the below, but have not read it, cuz as I have mentioned before, I am a slow reader.
Will read and comment further later, but if anyone wishes to go ahead before me, feel free.
"Going Dark" initiative mini-dig:
http://www.georgewythereview.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fall_2018_Johnson.pdf
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Q20191776 ago
The mini-dig document I linked is a good read (so far). It gives background about the history of laws related to data surveillance and seizure by law enforcement from Title III to CALEA to PATRIOT to FREEDOM to the FBI "Going Dark" initiative.
It then points out 4 ethical difficulties, discussing each. Just an excerpt as example: "Specifically, this study identifies four ethical challenges associated with the “Going Dark” initiative: (1) the negative ramifications for private communication companies, (2) the potential increase in the domestic terrorism threat, (3) international exploitation, and (4) the possibility for abuse. ... The third ethical challenge stemming from the proposed “Going Dark” strategy is the potential for foreign government exploitation. ...Based on the recent programs implemented by the Chinese government, especially in terms of their recent 2015 counterterrorism law, it is clear that one of the focuses of the current administration is to strictly regulate “untrustworthy” foreign technology companies. International law firms studying the newly enacted Chinese counterterrorism law have started to warn American technology companies that China has the capability to legally demand source codes, encryption keys, and other crucial forms of information regarding communication servers from foreign technology companies currently operating in China (Alsabah, 2017). "
At this point in my reading, besides posting here, I am turning my worries about this situation over to God in prayer.
I know He is all knowing and all powerful, so it seems like the right thing to do.